Agentic PrimitivesAGENTIC PRIMITIVES

Day 19 of 21 · The missing layer · Acting ·

Receipts that travel with the agent

Day 19. Evidence is the owner’s, not the platform’s.

Richard Pedersen · Agentic Trust Labs · Rich Canvas

If your vendor's tracing product disappeared tomorrow, what could a counterparty still prove about what your agent did last week?

Day 19 of 21 · The missing layer

Most agent traces answer "what did the runtime do?" Ours are built to answer "what did this principal do, under this grant — and can anyone show it without the runtime's cooperation?"

Every protected step produces a step receipt:

— the tool, its declared risk, the capability; — the mandate reference and the verifier's decision; — approvals — who signed, over which digest; — an idempotency key and an input digest; — the transaction hash, if value moved; — the digest of the playbook that admitted the run.

Receipts go to two places the runtime does not own.

A hash-chained audit sink. Each row commits to the previous; tampering with the middle is visible. This is the tamper-evident execution log the NANDA papers call for — except it is not a platform log. It is a chain the owner holds.

A PROV-O / P-Plan graph in the owner's vault. Who, what, under which plan step, derived from which intent, associated with which agent — the same vocabulary for single runs, fabric exchanges and multi-party Endeavors. And the same ontology that classified the agent as a person, organization or service (Day 5) and typed the intent it acted on (Day 8) now describes what it did. Provenance is not a schema bolted on after the fact; it is the same T-box, read backwards. The public knowledge base never sees it: provenance of private acts is private.

Beside them, verification receipts — a verifier's signed record of what it checked and found — so evidence is disputable deterministically before anyone adjudicates.

What we refuse to prove: code integrity as identity. A TEE attestation or an SBOM answers "is this the binary?" It cannot answer "may this binary act as Alice?" Conflating the two is how a compromised attester becomes everyone. What we do attest is the behavior definition: the compiled playbook digest, verified at load, stamped on every receipt. A counterparty can know which playbook produced an act without any claim about the binary that ran it.

The line: a receipt is a worse observability product and a better evidence product.

Question: If your vendor's tracing product disappeared tomorrow, what could a counterparty still prove about what your agent did last week?

#Provenance #PROVO #AIAgents #Audit #AgenticWeb