Microsoft Agent Framework
The enterprise architecture reference — agent / workflow / hosting / context-provider / hooks separation; sequential, concurrent, handoff, group-chat, Magentic; a durable extension; FIDES information flow.
take · The context-provider boundary (prepare / observe) and hooks as middleware, never authority.
differ · FIDES + hooks + approvals never amount to an intent-bound mandate. Their supervise / group-chat live inside the loop; ours are the coordination plane, because between-agent scheduling without a signed commitment is decided by a component that cannot be held to it.
Google ADK
A2A-native, multi-language; sessions / state / memory as separate concepts; resumability.
take · The local-subagent vs remote-A2A-agent distinction — one A2A message, one receipt, never in-process.
differ · ADK identity is deployment identity. Ours is the SA address; an agent survives its runtime being replaced.
LangGraph · Deep Agents · LangSmith
Graph state, durable checkpoints, interrupts, time travel; an opinionated harness; a mature ops platform with traces becoming evals.
take · Checkpoint semantics; production traces as evaluation datasets — ours is the AUTHORITY test set.
differ · LangSmith replay re-plays what happened. Ours must re-derive the authority decisions against recorded state; a replay that reuses old verdicts is a defect here.
Dapr Agents
GA distributed durability — durable workflows, resume after failure, durable human approvals, pre-invocation hooks, mTLS.
take · “Agent reliability is distributed-systems primitives, not serialized chat history” — why a Run is an A2A Task in a Durable Object.
differ · Dapr identity authenticates workloads. A workload is never an agent here; which agent it may act as is a signed binding, what it may do is a mandate.
Agno AgentOS
One self-hosted runtime exposing agents, teams, workflows over A2A; RBAC; persisted approvals.
take · One runtime, many archetypes — our derived agent types on one SA substrate.
differ · AgentOS RBAC is standing permission on endpoints. Our gate asks why now: same endpoint, same caller, different sentence is a deny.
Strands
Intervention handlers with explicit precedence (deny / confirm / guide / transform / proceed); Cedar authorization.
take · The intervention point — the closest analog to where verifyMandateForStep sits.
differ · Cedar evaluates standing rules (“a Treasurer may pay < $1,000”). A mandate is contextual: pay THIS payee ≤ THIS amount for THIS intent until THIS time after THIS approval.
Mastra
TypeScript DX; A2A 0.3 + 1.0 with task lifecycle, signed cards, a local Studio.
take · Their documented caveat — A2A task records are in-memory — is the lesson: protocol-level task support ≠ durable execution.
differ · Our cards are released, JWS-signed and EIP-712 bound to an on-chain identity, not just signed by a deployment key.
Pydantic AI + Harness
A typed loop where every harness feature is a composable Capability; deferred SKILL.md loading; two published security lessons.
take · Both lessons are doctrine here: skill visibility never authorizes; client approval is not a boundary — which is why approval becomes a redemption precondition on chain.
differ · Their Capability is a feature toggle. Ours is a semantic identity that mandates name, discovery matches and receipts cite.
CrewAI
Role-oriented crews plus deterministic flows.
take · The crews / flows split restates our coordination / orchestration split.
differ · A CrewAI role is prompt configuration. Ours is a situation-plane record that grants nothing; the delegation does.
OpenAI Agents SDK
The minimal loop — agents-as-tools, handoffs, guardrails, serializable HITL state.
take · Proof the loop should stay small; our orchestration core is ~400 lines for the same reason.
differ · Their handoff is in-process. Ours crosses an authority boundary with a child delegation.
Buzz.xyz (Block)
A human + agent workspace on Nostr: agents as first-class members with keypairs, one permission framework, workflows that pause for approval, external runtimes over ACP.
take · Triggers as playbook-declared automations; ACP runtimes admitted as member agents under scoped delegations — “your Goose agent, with on-chain-revocable scope.”
differ · It is our Home’s shape on a weaker trust base: identity is a keypair (no custody, recovery or revocation), permission is an ACL, approval is a click. Ours: a signature, a grant, a revocation.